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CASE DIGEST
This Case Digest provides brief analysis of cases that represent
current aspects of transnational law. The digest includes cases that
apply established legal principles to new and different factual situations. The cases are grouped in topical categories, and references
are given for further research.
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1. ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
HICKENLOOPER AMENDMENT INAPPLICABLE TO OIL DRILLING CONCESSION GRANTED BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

Plaintiff, an importer of petroleum into the United States, sued

to recover crude oil seized on tankers in the Persian Gulf and
shipped to America. Plaintiff had been granted the exclusive right
to extract oil beneath the territorial waters claimed by the Trucial
State of Umm al Qaywayn (Umm). Buttes Oil & Gas Company
(Buttes) subsequently had been granted an oil and gas concession
by the ruler of Sharjah, an adjoining Trucial State. The agreement
between Buttes and Sharjah was later expanded to include the
territorial waters claimed by Umm and covered by plaintiff's concession. Umm, Sharjah, and Iran reached an interim agreement
that postponed final settlement of the territorial waters dispute
and awarded an exclusive concession to Buttes, with royalties
shared by the three states. Before any oil was extracted from the
disputed area, Umm terminated plaintiff's concession, alleging
breach of contract. Buttes soon commenced extracting oil, which
began arriving in the United States in September 1974. Plaintiff
contended that the actions of Umm, Sharjah, and Iran were tantamount to a confiscation and that the Hickenlooper Amendment
required adjudication of the controversy. Defendant asserted that
the Act of State Doctrine precluded inquiry into the acts of Iran
677

678

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[Vol. 9.:677

and Sharjah. The District Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. The
court noted that to render a decision would be to decide a boundary dispute that Iran, Sharjah, and Umm have intentionally postponed. Significance-When plaintiff challenges an act of a foreign
government that is unrelated to confiscation of title to real property, the Hickenlooper Amendment does not apply and the Act of
State Doctrine may be invoked to bar any claim for damages resulting from that action. Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn v. Cities
Services Oil Co., 396 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. La. 1975).
2.

ADMIRALTY

SHIPOWNER IS ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FROM TORTFEASOR WHEN
A COVENANT OF WORKMANLIKE PERFORMANCE BY THE TORTFEASOR CAN
REASONABLY BE IMPLIED

Plaintiff, a seaman employed by States Line, was injured due to
the unseaworthiness of the Navy landing craft that was transporting him to shore. Even though the Government's contract did not
contain a requirement to provide ship-to-shore transportation for
States Line's crew members, States Line subsequently sought indemnity from the Government. The court implied a warranty of
workmanlike performance, but cautioned that there could be no
implied warranty unless the relationship of the tortfeasor and
shipowner made the implication reasonable. The court noted the
"symbiotic" relationship of the Navy and States Line concerning
the launch service, and the court also observed that the Navy was
in the best position to remedy problems with the Navy landing
craft. Significance-This holding extends the shipowner's right to
indemnification to cases in which the obligation of workmanlike
performance can reasonably be implied in the absence of an express contract between the indemnitor and the indemnitee for
launch service between vessel and shore. Flunker v. United States,
528 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1975).
JUDICIALLY-CREATED MARITIME WRONGFUL DEATH CAUSE OF

ACTION

APPLIES RETROACTIVELY AS EXCLUSIVE REMEDY

Defendant's ship collided with a United States Coast Guard
vessel in Louisiana territorial waters in 1968. Claims were filed
under the Louisiana wrongful death statute for damages resulting
from the injuries and deaths of Coast Guard crewmen, and for
property damage. Defendant appealed the award of damages for

"emotional distress," contending there should be no award for
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"mental grief and anguish," and also argued that the comparative
negligence rule for allocating property damage should apply. The
court determined that the decision in Moragne v. States Marine
Line, 398 U.S. 375 (1970), which created a new cause of action for
wrongful death under general maritime law, should apply retroactively and preclude recognition in admiralty of state wrongful
death statutes. The court held that the district court should appartion its award for "emotional distress," eliminating the compensation for mental anguish, which is not compensable under general
maritime wrongful death actions. The court also retroactively applied the rule of comparative negligence for allocating property
damage liability, as stated in United States v. Reliable Transfer
Company, Inc., 421 U.S. 397 (1975), since it would not produce

substantial inequitable results in this case. Significance-This
case eliminates the use of state wrongful death statutes in maritime cases, and extends the comparative negligence rule to pre1975 actions where it is not shown that the parties relied on the
divided damages rule. Matter of SIS Helena, 529 F.2d 744 (5th Cir.
1976).
TIME-CHARTERER NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FOR

LITIGATION

EXPENSES WHEN NOT OBLIGATED TO PROVIDE SEAWORTHY VESSEL

Time-charterer's employee was injured during the loading of its
ship, and the third-party defendant stevedore was required to indemnify the defendant shipowner. The time-charterer was absolved of liability, and then moved for indemnity from the stevedore for its defense costs and attorneys' fees. The time-charterer
argued that the stevedore breached its contract by failing to load
the ship properly and that litigation expenses were a compensable
result of the breach. The time-charterer also claimed breach of an
implied warranty of workmanlike performance running in its favor,
or as a third-party beneficiary of the implied warranty. The Court
of Appeals ruled that a litigant has no right to indemnification for
its defense costs and attorneys' fees absent a statute or enforceable
contract term providing for such, or a warranty of workmanlike
performance running in favor of the time-charterer. Significance-This case demonstrates that there is no right to indemni-

fication in favor of the time-charterer when he has not assumed
an obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel. Stranaham v. A/S
Atlantica & Tinfos Papirfabrik,521 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1975).
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CLAIMS WITHIN SCOPE OF THE PUBLIC VESSELS ACT CANNOT BE
BROUGHT UNDER THE TERMS OF THE SUITS IN ADMIRALTY ACT

The fishing vessel of plaintiff, a Philippine corporation, sank
after a collision with a naval destroyer of defendant, the United
States. The plaintiff sought recovery for damages and asserted in
personam admiralty jurisdiction over the defendant under both
the Suits in Admiralty Act and the Public Vessels Act. The district
court denied jurisdiction. It found first that the Public Vessels Act
applied to the exclusion of the Suits in Admiralty Act, since the
destroyer was a United States public vessel. It then ruled specifically that the plaintiff's suit was barred by the reciprocity provision of the Public Vessels Act, since the Philippine Government
would not have allowed similar suits by nationals of the United
States. The court of appeals reversed. It determined that admiralty jurisdiction could be obtained under either Act, thereby permitting the plaintiff to claim under the Suits in Admiralty Act and
circumvent entirely the reciprocity requirement of the Public Vessels Act. The court of appeals justified this decision on the strength
of the 1960 amendment to the Suits in Admiralty Act, which omitted the original proviso that United States vessels charged with
wrongdoing must be employed as merchant vessels before sovereign immunity of the United States could be waived under the Act.
The court took this deletion to signify that the United States could
be sued for the torts of both its public and merchant vessels under
the Suits in Admiralty Act, without reference to the Public Vessels
Act. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and sided
with the district court, holding that plaintiff's suit could only be
maintained under the Public Vessels Act and was therefore barred
by lack of reciprocity. The Court reasoned that to decide otherwise
would allow evasion of the Public Vessels Act at will by plaintiffs
and would therefore constitute an effective repeal of the Act without an express repeal by Congress. This would contravene the cardinal principle of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. The Court reviewed the legislative history of
the 1960 amendment to the Suits in Admiralty Act and concluded
that Congress' purpose had not been to render nugatory the provisions of the Public Vessels Act. Instead, the Court determined that
Congress meant to end the confusion and harsh results possible for
plaintiffs attempting to choose the proper forum for a claim exceeding $10,000 against the United States by virtually eliminating
the quasi-admiralty jurisdiction of the Court of Claims under the
Tucker Act. Significance-This holding reasserts in a commonsense manner the jurisdiction of the Public Vessels Act and its
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sound public policy justifications in the face of a novel attack.
United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 96 S.Ct. 1319
(1976).
LUMBER EMPLOYEE WORKING ON SALTWATER POND HELD NOT EN-

GAGED IN MARITIME EMPLOYMENT AND NOT COVERED BY

LHWCA

Claimant-employee was injured while working as a "pondman"
for Weyerhauser Company. His duties consisted of sorting logs on
a saltwater pond and feeding them into a mill for processing. The
Benefits Review Board for the Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs of the United States Department of Labor,
granted compensation to claimant under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. § 901 et
seq.. The issue on appeal was whether the claimant, who was not
working as a longshoreman or harborworker, was entitled to compensation under the LHWCA. The court reversed the Benefits
Review Board, holding that the claimant was not engaged in maritime employment and not entitled to LHWCA coverage. The court
noted that the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA that expanded
the definition of "navigable waters" to include "adjoining" piers
and other areas did not extend coverage and uniform compensa-

tion to anyone injured in an adjoining area. Instead, the court held
that the LHWCA amendments only extended coverage to maritime employees injured in adjoining areas. Significance-This
holding demonstrates the protective scope of LHWCA in case of
injury on adjoining piers and other areas. Weyerhauser Company
v. Gilmore, 528 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1976).
3.

ALIEN'S RIGHTS

UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF UNWED FATHERS FOR IMMIGRATION PURPOSES
HELD CONSTITUTIONAL

Plaintiffs, three unwed natural fathers and their illegitimate offspring, contended that the definition of parent and child in the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., is unconstitutional on its face since unwed natural fathers are excluded
from favorable treatment while unwed natural mothers are not. In
each case either the father or child is a United States citizen and
the other is an alien excluded from the United States. The court
held that the potential for sham claims, administrative inconvenience, and problems of investigation are sufficient to create a
rational basis for the statutory distinction and entered judgment
for defendant. The court observed that such suspect grounds for
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discrimination as race, physical condition, political beliefs, sex,
age, and national origin may be acceptable when applied to aliens.
Significance-This affirms the constitutionality of the distinction
between unwed natural fathers and mothers for immigration purposes in the Eastern District of New York. Fiallo v. Levi, 406 F.
Supp. 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
4. ANTITRUST
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE DOES NOT FORECLOSE ANTITRUST CLAIM
WHERE CLAIM CAN BE RESOLVED WITHOUT EXAMINATION OF FOREIGN
GOVERNMENT'S ACTS

Plaintiff, an independent Libyan oil producer, brought suit
against other Libyan oil producers for violations of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. § 8.
Defendants contended that plaintiff's first claim of unlawfully
imposed customer and market restrictions, second claim of an unlawful group boycott, and third claim of conspiracy to have plaintiff's Libyan oil concession nationalized were foreclosed by the Act
of State Doctrine, which precludes judicial inquiry into the public
acts of a foreign government within that government's own territory. Ruling on defendants' pre-trial motions, the court held that

the acts of the Libyan government need not be examined to resolve
the issues presented by the first two claims. The court granted
defendants' motion to dismiss the third claim and refused to consider merely the conduct which led to the acts of the Libyan
government without examining the acts themselves.
Significance-This case demonstrates that the Act of State Doctrine does not foreclose an antitrust claim where the claim can be
resolved without examination of the acts of the foreign government. Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corporation,410 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
CUSTOMERS OF INTERMEDIATE NON-TARGET SUPPLIERS LACK STANDING TO BRING ANTITRUST ACTIONS AGAINST MAJOR OIL COMPANIES

STAGING BOYCOTT OF

O.P.E.C. MEMBER

Defendant major oil companies staged a group boycott of Libyan
crude oil in response to the announced nationalization of 51 per
cent of defendants' Libyan interests. As a result, plaintiffs' intermediate suppliers were unable to deliver needed oil at agreed
prices. Plaintiffs then brought antitrust actions which were consolidated at trial. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal of the plaintiffs' actions, agreeing with the trial court
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that no matter how immediate and foreseeable their injuries might
be, customers injured as a result of their relationship to an intermediate "non-target" of the boycott do not have standing to bring
antitrust actions against the boycott-staging companies. The court
remanded one count, however, in which plaintiffs alleged that defendants conspired to reduce the supply of fuel available and to
inflate unreasonably the price charged for it to east coast electric
utilities. Significance-The court observed this conspiracy would,
if proven, make plaintiffs' supplier a member of the conspiracy
instead of a victim and would give plaintiffs standing to bring the
antitrust action. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of
Calif., 521 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir. 1975).
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT DISCRIMINATORY PRICING PROHIBITIONS APPLY
ONLY TO WHOLLY DOMESTIC TRANSACTIONS

Plaintiffs brought treble damage suits against defendants, alleging violations of antidumping provisions of the antitrust laws.
Defendants filed motions to dismiss those counts of plaintiffs' complaints based on section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 13(a), which prohibits price discrimination between different purchasers of commodities of like grade where any of the
purchasers are involved in commerce and where the commodities
are sold for use, consumption, or resale in the United States. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants sold televisions and other electronic
products to United States purchasers at lower prices than those
charged to Japanese purchasers, and that the Robinson-Patman
section applies whenever either branch of purchasers are in United
States commerce. Defendants argued that the Act does not apply
because the sales to Japanese purchasers are not for use, consumption, or resale within the United States. The court granted the
motions to dismiss the section 2(a) counts and held the section
inapplicable because the sales must be wholly within United
States commerce. The court interpreted the requirement of use,
consumption, or resale as a general requirement that the purchase
be in United States commerce to come under section 2(a) of the
Act. Significance-This case of first impression limits the discriminatory pricing use of the Robinson-Patman Act to wholly domestic transactions. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., 402 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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BANKRUPTCY

No DISTINCTION EXISTS BETWEEN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC BANKS FOR
PURPOSES OF BANKRUPTCY

Defendant Israel-British Bank (IBB) was a banking corporation
that owned property in the United States, although it was not
chartered and operating in the United States. IBB was adjudicated
bankrupt after filing a voluntary bankruptcy petition in the United
States. Plaintiffs, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and
the Bank of the Commonwealth, had perfected creditor liens
against IBB. The liens could have been voided by the trustee in
bankruptcy on the basis of the express exclusion of "banking corporations" from the statute. IBB argued that the foreign banks
could be adjudicated bankrupt since Congress had considered only
domestic and territorial banks when excepting "banking corpora-

tions." The court held the "banking corporations" exclusion did
comprehend foreign banks. Significance-This case, a case of first
impression, precludes use of the voluntary provisions of the Bankruptcy Act by the international banking community. In re IsraelBritish Bank (London) Limited, 401 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
6.

CUSTOMS AND TRADE REGULATIONS

TRADE ACT OF 1974 EMPOWERS PRESIDENT TO IMPOSE LICENSE FEES
ON IMPORTS THREATENING NATIONAL SECURITY

President Ford ordered the increase of license fees for oil imported to the United States, as authorized by the Trade Act of 1974
§ 232(b), 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (Supp. IV), in response to finding
that national security was jeopardized by excessive importation of
petroleum products. Respondents, several utility companies and
eight states, sought to enjoin the order and contended that imposition of the fees exceeded the President's constitutional and statutory authority. Appeals determined that the statutory language
empowering the President to "adjust the imports" authorized
quantitative restrictions but prohibited monetary controls. The
Supreme Court held that section 232(b) permits the President to
impose fees on imports and that the regulatory power was not an
unconstitutional delegation of power. The Court stated that section 232(b) and its legislative history were ambiguous as to the
nature of the President's discretionary powers once an effect on
national security is discovered. Consequently, the Court chose to
interpret broadly the power to "adjust" imports so as to include
monetary controls. Since the statute stipulated factors to be con-
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sidered before presidental authority is invoked, the Court declared
that Congress has devised an intelligible principle to direct the
grant of discretionary power to the President, thereby obviating an
improper delegation of legislative power. Significance-Once the
importation of an article is found to impair national security under
section 232(b), the President is not restricted in choosing quantitative or monetary controls to curb the imports. Federal Energy
Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 96 S.Ct. 2295 (1976).
BREACH OF REPRESENTATIONS IN SUPPLIER'S CERTIFICATE EXECUTED

By

EXPORTER OF MEDICINAL

DRUGS GIVEs

UNITED STATES INDEPEN-

DENT CAUSE OF ACTION FOR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES

The Agency for International Development (AID) brought suit

against exporters of medicinal drugs for breach of a sales contract
with Vietnamese importers. Defendants had executed an AID Supplier's Certificate as part of the arrangement by which AID financed the transaction, obligating them to comply with AID regulations requiring adherence to the terms of letters of credit issued
by financing banks. The letters of credit, in turn, required compli-

ance with certain provisions of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act concerned with the safety and efficacy of the exported
drugs. The government's complaint alleged breach of representations contained in those documents, and that shipment of the

drugs was illegal under the Act, thereby entitling the government
to recover the full sum paid for those shipments. On motion for
summary judgment, defendants argued that AID was merely the
promisee in a three-party arrangement in which the Vietnamese
importers were donee third-party beneficiaries who lacked standing to sue for compensatory damages. Relying on a similar holding

in United States v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 471 F.2d 186 (5th
Cir. 1973), the court ruled that the government lacked standing
because breach of an AID Supplier's Certificate creates an independent cause of action for compensatory damages. Significance-This case confirms the utility of the Supplier's Certificate
as a device for affording AID a greater degree of control over the
administration of its programs and policies. United States v.
Emons Industries, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
FOREIGN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS OF THE BANK SECRECY

ACT

ARE

CONSTITUTIONAL

Defendant citizen was discovered to be transporting a large sum
of cash into the United States by United States Customs Inspectors during a routine border search. Defendant refused to comply
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with the foreign reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act,
which called for disclosure of the name and business of the person
for whom the money was being transported, as well as the address
and destination of the person transporting the money. Defendant
was charged with willful violation, and moved to dismiss the information against her on grounds that the reporting requirements
violate her first amendment right to freedom of association. The
court held that defendant's first amendment rights were not violated since disclosure of at most an agency relationship and the
identities of those others involved would not expose defendant to
criminal liability. The court also supported its denial of the first
amendment claim by noting that disclosure of the information by
defendant would certainly not involve defendant's beliefs or affiliations. Significance-In a case of first impression, the court upheld
the constitutionality of the foreign reporting requirements of the
Bank Secrecy Act. United States v. San Juan, 405 F. Supp. 686
(D. Vt. 1975).
SEARCH WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE OF VESSEL DOCKED IN UNITED

STATES HARBOR MAY BE JUSTIFIED AS CUSTOMS SEARCH IF AGENTS
ARE REASONABLY CERTAIN THAT VESSEL CAME FROM INTERNATIONAL
WATERS

Defendants' boat was observed by customs agents as it was being
docked in San Diego Bay. The agents searched the boat and found
880 pounds of marijuana. Defendants contended the search was
without probable cause and could not be justified as a customs
search since the boat was well within United States territorial
waters when observed by customs agents. The government argued
that effective enforcement of the customs laws necessitates searching all vessels whether or not there is reason to believe they have
been in international waters. The court determined that search of
a vessel in harbor without probable cause pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §
1581(a) may be valid under the fourth amendment as a border
search as a "functional equivalent" of the border where there is
evidence the boat actually came from international or foreign waters, or where there are articulable facts supporting a reasonably
certain conclusion by customs officers that the vessel crossed the
border into United States territory. The case was remanded to
determine whether defendants actually crossed the border, and if
the customs agents were reasonably certain of the border crossing.
Significance-This case establishes that customs agents must be
reasonably certain a border crossing has occurred before they can
justifiably make a customs search of a vessel already within United
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States waters, even though proof of an actual crossing may not be
obtainable. United States v. Tilton, 534 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1976).
7.

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

NATIONAL OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MEMBER STATE GUARANTEED
PROTECTIONS OF RIGHT TO TRAVEL THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNITY

Questions concerning the prosecution of Royer, a French national, to prevent his illegal entry and residence in Belgium
prompted a preliminary ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Communities. Royer, a man with a criminal record, was discovered to have resided in Belgium since 1971 without complying
with Belgian administrative formalities for entrance. Royer was
ordered to leave Belgium; but he returned, and was arrested. The
ministerial decree expelling Royer stated his conduct showed his
mere presence to be a "danger to public policy." The Court of
Justice ruled that right of entry to another Member State is directly conferred on any person subject to Community law, regardless of the administrative requirements of the host state. The Court

further ruled that the host state is obligated to issue a residence
permit to any person subject to Community law, and that mere
noncompliance with entrance formalities is not conduct that
threatens the host state's public policy and security.
Significance-This case illustrates the limitations imposed by
Community law upon the right of any Community Member State
to exclude or expel a national of another Community Member
State. Royer, Proceedings of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities, Case 48/75 (April 8, 1976).
8.
Am

CARRIER

INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT
NOT

LIABLE UNDER WARSAW CONVENTION FOR PASSEN-

GER INJURIES AFTER DISEMBARKING

Plaintiffs sought damages from defendant air carrier for personal
injuries and deaths resulting from a terrorist attack in the baggage
area of Lod Airport, Tel Aviv. The baggage area was not under the
defendant's control. Plaintiffs claimed defendant carrier was
liable without fault, based on the Warsaw Convention, as modified
by the Montreal Agreement. The Convention provides for carrier
liability in case of passenger injury during embarking or disembarking. Plaintiffs would extend the applicability of the Warsaw
Convention to include accidents occurring after passengers had
reached the apparent safety of the terminal. The court refused to
extend the existing case law and granted defendant's motion for
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summary judgment, noting the victims had concluded air travel
and disembarked at the time of the attack. Significance-This
case illustrates the scope of carrier liability under the Warsaw
Convention for passenger injuries not sustained during flight,
boarding, or disembarking. In re Tel Aviv, 405 F. Supp. 154 (D.
Puerto Rico 1975).
9. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
FOREIGN TRIBUNALS NEED NOT BE CONVENTIONAL COURT PROCEED-

INGS TO QUALIFY FOR UNITED STATES JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE

Tokyo District Court requested immediate assistance in taking
depositions of California residents, as allowed for by the "Procedures for Mutual Assistance in Administration of Justice in
Connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corp. Matter." The depositions were required by the Tokyo public prosecutor for use in
criminal investigations and possible future criminal trials. The
California residents obtained a stay of proceedings pending appeal
and argued that the role of the Tokyo District Court was not that
of a foreign "tribunal" contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 1782. The
court determined that the 1964 amendment to section 1782 broadened prior law and permitted extension of international assistance
to bodies of a quasi-judicial or administrative nature at the court's
discretion. Since both the public prosecutor and district court of
Tokyo were empowered to make decisions of a judicial or quasijudicial nature, the court ruled that section 1782 was satisfied and
vacated the stay. Significance-A court may, in its discretion,
grant United States judicial assistance to foreign administrative
tribunals and quasi-judicial agencies, as well as conventional court
proceedings in foreign countries. In re Letters Rogatory From the
Tokyo District, Tokyo, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1976).
QUASI-IN REM ATTACHMENT OF FOREIGN CORPORATION BY NONRESIDENT DEFENDANT IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS

Plaintiff purchaser of fish, a New York corporation, sued the

non-resident seller when the fish arrived in damaged condition.
Defendant seller filed a third-party complaint against the shipowner, a foreign corporation, asserting quasi-in rem jurisdiction
by attaching its New York Protection & Indemnity insurance policy. The third-party defendant challenged jurisdiction by alleging

that the attachment in New York by a non-resident of New York
was violative of due process. The court denied the third-party defendant's jurisdictional challenge, even though it recognized that
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New York residency of the attaching party is a "crucial consideration" in the absence of special circumstances. The court noted the
defendant had been unwillingly brought into the jurisdiction, and
that the defendant claimed justice would not be possible without
the attachment. The court found sufficient forum interest in the
welfare of persons in its jurisdiction, especially those involuntarily
brought before its courts, to provide jurisdiction for the third-party
attachment. Significance-This decision clarifies and expands the
permissible use of quasi-in rem attachments by non-resident defendants. Seafood Imports, Inc. v. A.J. Cunningham Packing
Corp., 405 F. Supp. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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